Document Details Document Type : Article In Journal  Document Title : Coevolutionary success-driven multigames Coevolutionary success-driven multigames   Subject : physics  Document Language : English  Abstract : Wealthy individuals may be less tempted to defect than those with comparatively low payoffs. To take this into consideration, we introduce coevolutionary success-driven multigames in structured populations. While the core game is always the weak prisoner's dilemma, players whose payoffs from the previous round exceed a threshold adopt only a minimally low temptation to defect in the next round. Along with the strategies, the perceived strength of the social dilemma thus coevolves with the success of each individual player. We show that the lower the threshold for using the small temptation to defect, the more the evolution of cooperation is promoted. Importantly, the promotion of cooperation is not simply due to a lower average temptation to defect, but rather due to a dynamically reversed direction of invasion along the interfaces that separate cooperators and defectors on regular networks. Conversely, on irregular networks, in the absence of clear invasion fronts, the promotion of cooperation is due to intermediate-degree players. At sufficiently low threshold values, these players accelerate the erosion of defectors and significantly shorten the fixation time towards more cooperative stationary states. Coevolutionary multigames could thus be the new frontier for the swift resolution of social dilemmas.  ISSN : 0295-5075  Journal Name : EPL  Volume : 108  Issue Number : 2  Publishing Year : 1435 AH 2014 AD  Article Type : Article  Added Date : Sunday, July 30, 2017  Researchers Researcher Name (Arabic) Researcher Name (English) Researcher Type Dr Grade Email Attila Szolnok Szolnok, Attila Investigator Doctorate   Matjaz Perc Perc, Matjaz Researcher Doctorate   Files File Name Type Description  42338.pdf pdf   Back To Researches Page