Document Details

Document Type : Article In Journal 
Document Title :
Costly hide and seek pays: unexpected consequences of deceit in a social dilemma
Costly hide and seek pays: unexpected consequences of deceit in a social dilemma
 
Subject : physics 
Document Language : English 
Abstract : Deliberate deceptiveness intended to gain an advantage is commonplace in human and animal societies. In a social dilemma, an individual may only pretend to be a cooperator to elicit cooperation from others, while in reality he is a defector. With this as motivation, we study a simple variant of the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game entailing deceitful defectors and conditional cooperators that lifts the veil on the impact of such two-faced behavior. Defectors are able to hide their true intentions at a personal cost, while conditional cooperators are probabilistically successful at identifying defectors and act accordingly. By focusing on the evolutionary outcomes in structured populations, we observe a number of unexpected and counterintuitive phenomena. We show that deceitful behavior may fare better if it is costly, and that a higher success rate of identifying defectors does not necessarily favor cooperative behavior. These results are rooted in the spontaneous emergence of cycling dominance and spatial patterns that give rise to fascinating phase transitions, which in turn reveal the hidden complexity behind the evolution of deception. 
ISSN : 1367-2630 
Journal Name : NEW JOURNAL OF PHYSICS 
Volume : 162 
Issue Number : 11 
Publishing Year : 1435 AH
2012 AD 
Article Type : Article 
Added Date : Thursday, July 27, 2017 

Researchers

Researcher Name (Arabic)Researcher Name (English)Researcher TypeDr GradeEmail
Attila (Szolnok(Szolnok, Attila InvestigatorDoctorateszolnoki.attila@ttk.mta.hu
Matjaz PercPerc, Matjaz ResearcherDoctorate 

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